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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

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INTRODUCTION

The Intelligence Community Staff has been working on proposals to improve intelligence support to the national decision makers in times of crisis and to make overall improvements in intelligence products.

Our first priority was to study intelligence support in crisis situations. We presented a briefing on this subject in July to the DCI, the Deputy Directors of CIA, the White House Situation Room, DIA, NSA, INR, and the NMCC. With their cooperation we began tests of a secure voice conferencing net which still is underway.

Today, we will present the background of our proposal for a family of national intelligence products, an abbreviated version of the July briefing on crisis support, and our proposal for the national intelligence products.

The DCI wants to keep the USIB apprised of the IC efforts in this field and to take advantage of any views you may have. A copy of the briefing will be sent to each of you by the USIB Secretariat.

11 October 1973

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS*

(VUGRAPH #1)

This briefing was prepared as an Intelligence Community Staff recommendation to the DCI for the development of a family of national intelligence products. Mr. Colby heard it and requested that it be presented to the USIB for comment.

The product family is designed to provide the national consumer with better intelligence support than he receives today. The briefing necessarily includes an outline of the IC Staff's concept of the role of the National Intelligence Officers in national intelligence production.

At the outset, we emphasize that the recommended package of national intelligence products is not one which must be accepted in its totality or not at all. In fact, should these national products be accepted, we recommend that the new ones be introduced incrementally, and then only after the principal production managers at CIA, DIA and INR develop the details of production. We are not recommending the

*Where the transcript of the briefing does not make clear what information is contained on the vugraphs, a brief description is provided in the text.

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elimination of any single agency departmental publications and we are not addressing the needs for specialized products such as personality analyses, organizational politics studies and the like.

As an introduction to the details of our proposal, we need to expose the approach taken and some of the thinking which underlies these recommendations. Two terms need definition. The first is "national intelligence products".

(VUGRAPH #2)

(Vugraph reads: "Finished, community coordinated, foreign intelligence produced on both a scheduled and unscheduled basis and designed to assist national decision makers and their staffs in formulating national security policy and plans.")

For the purpose of this briefing, we use community coordinated in the best sense of the term, that is, the best judgments of the entire community are incorporated in the product. We do not mean compromise language.

A second term we use is "national consumers". There are many consumers of intelligence both at the national and at other levels and they include personnel both within as well as outside of the intelligence community. For our purposes we define national consumers as this group.

(VUGRAPH #3)

(Vugraph outlines key consumers to include Pres, V-P,

Ass't to Pres NSA, ExDir Council ECO Policy, CIEP, OMB,

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STR, PFIAB, Council ECO Advisers, Pres Adviser on Energy, and Principals at State, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, AEC, Atty Gen & Fed Reserve.)

The Intelligence Community Staff commenced study of national intelligence products more than six months ago. We used as our charge the draft of the DCI's objective paper which, when forwarded to the President on September 6th, read this way:

(VUGRAPH #4)

(Vugraph reads: "The responsiveness of the US foreign intelligence effort with respect to national requirements must be subject to continuing review and the quality scope and timeliness of the community's product must be improved.")

The DCI memorandum also set forth a series of tasks. Among them were these:

(VUGRAPH #5)

(Vugraph reads: "Through the NSCIC determine by December 1, 1973 which national intelligence products satisfy user needs and identify new product requirements." "Achieve significant improvements in product formats and production procedures to increase responsiveness early in 1974.")

As first order of business,

(VUGRAPH #6)

we conducted our own review of existing national products and then through interviews elicited the views and criticisms of some

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national consumers and national intelligence production managers. Based upon our review and their comments, we identified consensus criticisms and from these determined the objectives for a national intelligence product system. Finally, we defined each national intelligence product needed in terms of the purpose it should serve, its emphasis, its periodicity and production management procedures.

From our review of products we learned that the task of determining "which national intelligence products satisfy user needs" was practically a non-problem. As far as current and crisis intelligence goes,

(VUGRAPH #7)

there are few current products which qualify as national intelligence, and secondly, referring to that part of our charge which calls for us to achieve significant improvement in procedure, we noted that there are no established mechanisms or SOPs for producing national intelligence products during periods of crisis.

We then interviewed a large number of consumers and production managers. Among those interviewed were these:

(VUGRAPH #8)

(Vugraph lists Mr. Andrew Marshall, NSC Staffers, Members Kissinger's personal staff, White House Situation Room, Mr. Dam (of CEP), and production managers of CIA, DIA and State.)

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We learned that there was little problem in eliciting product criticism, but there was little consistency in the criticisms and the responses were very subjective. The reaction of national consumers to existing products and their views concerning various hypothetical products varied widely. The views expressed by the Director of the White House Situation Room, for instance, differed markedly from those of regional analysts in the National Security Council Staff. In turn, the NSC staffers held differing views among themselves. Each consumer perceived his needs differently. The intelligence products he favored differed accordingly.

While a great deal of information was gathered from these interviews, the most significant conclusions we reached were these.

(VUGRAPH #9)

No single family of intelligence products will meet the needs of all national consumers as their individual requirements significantly differ.

(Flip #1 - VUGRAPH #9)

Second, product evaluation is a very subjective art. Consumer views concerning any specific product constantly change as consumer interests change.

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(Flip #2 - VUGRAPH #9)

For these reasons, we concluded that whatever products we recommend should be as flexible as possible so that they could respond to the changing needs of consumers with a variety of interests. We found scheduled products to be less responsive to changing consumer needs than ad hoc products

(Flip #3 - VUGRAPH #9)

and therefore concluded that scheduled production should be kept to a minimum.

(Flip #4 - VUGRAPH #9)

Next, we found that there was a greater degree of consensus among consumers concerning their crisis intelligence product requirements than in the area of non-crisis intelligence production.

(Flip #5 - VUGRAPH #9)

Finally, we noted a reluctance by consumers, regardless of their criticisms of products, to recommend elimination of any product. Understandably, they desire to see the "better" product first before losing the current product regardless of its weak points.

While recognizing that our data base was limited, we were able to identify a consensus of the criticisms of current intelligence production. These criticisms were based upon the consumers' reaction to these products.

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(VUGRAPH #10)

(Vugraph lists a variety of scheduled daily, weekly, and monthly products of CIA, DIA, NSA, and INR.)

This is only a partial list of the products which find their way to the consumer's desk. (PAUSE)

(VUGRAPH #11)

The first criticism which the consumers made is that very few of these products represent coordinated national intelligence. Instead, they represent the views of a single agency.

(Line #1 VUGRAPH #11)

This criticism leads directly to the next one--that intelligence products are frequently overlapping and redundant. Consumers note they will often read an item on the same subject in as many as three competing intelligence products. The users' analytical effort is complicated by such problems as a single event being covered by different production agencies on different days -- or a single event being reported upon in different ways as separate agencies emphasize different aspects of the same problem.

(Line #2 VUGRAPH #11)

Another criticism made by national consumers is their opinion that they received inadequate service during crisis situations. During

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the Indo-Pak War in '71, to cite but one example, users stated that there was too much emphasis on factual reporting while there was too little emphasis on the analytical and estimative products which they desired.

In cases where the community had coordinated its production, users commented that in the interests of accommodating the disparate views of several intelligence agencies

(Line #3 VUGRAPH #11)

conclusions and estimates were not always clear. The consumers stated a preference for having conflicting views clearly exposed rather than subsumed in hedged and muffled judgments.

With these consensus criticisms in mind, we formulated objectives for a national intelligence product system.

(VUGRAPH #12)

First, the products should be focused on the national consumer. Second, recognizing the limited time which this audience has available, the number of products should be limited. Third, the products normally should reflect community judgments. Fourth, factual reporting in these products should be limited to a degree consistent with clarity while at the same time analytical reporting should be emphasized.

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Next, where the community is in disagreement, conflicting judgments should be highlighted. Finally, to insure that products are meeting consumer needs, consumers should be involved in production procedures.

Earlier we noted that there were no established mechanisms or SOPs for the production of national intelligence during periods of crisis.

This required us to consider what management procedures would be needed to alleviate this problem, and led us to an examination of the role of the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs).

From the various agency responses to the DCI memorandum on the subject of NIOs, there appear to be two basic visualizations of what role they should have:

(VUGRAPH #13)

One view of the NIO is as the DCI's special adviser and means of interface with the consumer, but having only a limited role in production.

A contrasting view sees the NIO as having a major role in production, down in the trenches, stimulating the community's production efforts in the name of the DCI. In developing our study we concluded that the latter view is the more valuable one for the NIO.

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All this is by way of background. It tells you where we started and what we learned en route to formulating our recommendations. The balance of our remarks address the proposed family of national intelligence products.

(VUGRAPH #14)

These products fall into two categories -- those driven by an ongoing or anticipated crisis and those designed to inform the national consumer of world-wide events in a non-crisis atmosphere. Our approach to the crisis problem will now be covered by

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PRODUCTS FOR NATIONAL CRISIS AND TENSION SITUATIONS

(VUGRAPH #15)

(Crisis and tension situations • System • Communications • Products)

During the past nine months several study proposals have addressed the problem of improving the flow of intelligence during crisis and tension situations. These studies have raised several problems including:

(VUGRAPH #16)

Issues in Current/Crisis Situations

1. Communications problems between producers and consumers.

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2. Intelligence Community lacks information on US military and diplomatic activities which might cause foreign reactions.
3. Flow of intelligence products to top-level consumers:
 - Timeliness
 - Lack of Community-wide summaries
 - Insufficient analytic intelligence

The NSCIC has asked the DCI to make recommendations.

The following presentation is in response to that request.

(VUGRAPH #17)

(APPROACH: Instead of creating new organizations-- take advantage of existing organizations by adding netted conference communications)

The main thrust of this proposal is to take maximum advantage of the national security organizational structure as it now exists. This structure is outlined as follows:

(VUGRAPH #18)

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Across the horizontal axis is a spectrum of potential warning time increments for various types of situations ranging from a crisis measured in minutes or a few hours

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to the energy "crisis" which creeps up over years of time. It can be seen from the figure that we are adequately organized for the long term situations (on the right) but there is a gap in organization for the crisis or tension situations (left side). The WSAG has no substructure to support it. It is this gap we propose to fill in a manner outlined in the following way:

(VUGRAPH #19)

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There is a major investment in the current watch offices of the national agencies and departments charged with diplomatic, military and intelligence operations. In almost any crisis situation one or more of those watch offices are the first in the Washington area to be informed. This proposal simply takes advantage of that fact and suggests that these watch offices be connected by a secure voice conferencing network.

This net would be activated on the first indication of a crisis, or potential crisis, and be the basis of the National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Net (NOIWON). It will be noted on the diagram that the NMCC is included to insure the inclusion of US military operations which might have generated a foreign response.

The next step upwards to fill the gap is the National Operations and Intelligence Analysts Net (NOIAN).

This net comes into being either during a crisis (after NOIWON notification) or in tension situations which have not yet reached crisis proportions. The selection of analysts in this net would be dictated by the type and location of the crisis. Fortunately, the NOIAN member organizations

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(including representation of the J-3) are organized along geographic lines. Thus a conference of specialists on a given crisis area can be quickly assembled either by remote conferencing or, if time allows, face to face. Remote conferencing in this case would use secure voice plus some visual capability such as text editing.

One advantage of these networks is that they would provide a substructure for support to national decision making in short-term crisis periods. This would balance the substructure which already exists to support longer term decision making. These networks also provide for operational as well as intelligence inputs into the early stages of crisis decision making. This proposal does not require any new facilities or additional manpower and modular improvements can be tested and implemented without major reorganization decisions.

Concerning the products which would be produced by the NOIWON/NOIAN system, this chart illustrates when they would be produced and what would be their purpose.

(VUGRAPH #20)

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Under this proposal the NOIWON and NOIAN nets will not produce products for the national consumer on a periodic basis but only when events dictate.

An illustrative example might be helpful. Should a crisis suddenly break, the NOIWON net would be activated and National Watch Officers Bulletins would be produced which would have these characteristics:

(VUGRAPH #21)

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
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It will be noted that under CONTENT, unknown and/or ambiguous information is identified with the hope that in disseminating the WOB some part of the structure will have the information available and respond.

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The second product is the National Analysts Summary. This, as its title implies, would serve the purpose of taking the information provided by the bulletins and adding analysis whenever feasible. The basic characteristics of this product would be:

(VUGRAPH #22)

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Here again feedback is requested regarding the plans
or decisions contemplated.



It is significant to note that National Analysts
Summaries do not have to be triggered by a crisis situation.
In a non-crisis situation the NOIAN can issue a NAS whenever
the level of tension demands it.

(VUGRAPH 23)

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The third crisis product is the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) which remains the same except for minor modifications. The intent of this product is to provide the national level policy maker with an estimate of the situation sufficiently definitive that it can serve as a basis for formulating a plan of action or establishing the reasoning for non-action.


You will note that the modified SNIE also has a feedback mechanism. Every crisis is unique and requirements cannot always be anticipated. The feedback procedure serves as a means of adjusting requirements as the situation unfolds.

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We considered how often Bulletins and Summaries would be issued.

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The National Watch Officers Bulletin is proposed as a format based on interrogatives arranged to generate a simple English sentence. It is designed to force the watch officers to answer each interrogative from the information available to them. The inability to fill a space clearly identifies missing or ambiguous information. This identification serves the needs of decision makers, analysts, and collectors. It also assists in preventing someone from overlooking the importance of missing information while they are under stress.

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(The final example shows how the Bulletin format can be used as a direct query for additional information.)

(VUGRAPH #24)

(VUGRAPH #25)

(VUGRAPH #26)

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In summary, the NOIWON/NOIAN system provides increased responsiveness by the intelligence community to national consumer needs. We conclude the following:

CONCLUSIONS

- . NOIWON-NOIAN CONFERENCING SYSTEM PROVIDES A CONVERGENCE OF OPERATIONAL, DIPLOMATIC AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION DURING CURRENT/CRISIS SITUATIONS.
- . THE REPORTING SYSTEM ENCOURAGES QUICK FEEDBACK FROM THE CONSUMER AS TO HIS INTELLIGENCE NEEDS PARTICULARLY IN UNPREDICTABLE SITUATIONS.
- . NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS ARE CREATED TO PROVIDE COMMUNITY SUMMARIES AND ANALYSIS WITH CLEARLY STATED AGREEMENT AND DISSENT.

The NOIWON is currently being tested for communication reliability, conferencing procedures and Bulletin creation procedures.

(VUGRAPH 27)

(Lists National Watch Officer Bulletin, National Analysts Summary, and Special National Intelligence Estimate)

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We believe these three national intelligence products will satisfy the need of the national decision makers and their staffs for crisis intelligence support. They do two important things--provide national intelligence products geared to a crisis situation where none exists today--and provide machinery permitting the community to move into a crisis situation in an orderly manner.

25X1 will discuss the other elements of our proposed family of national intelligence products.

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Let us now talk about the non-crisis situations and the national consumers' requirements. The consumers have expressed requirements for intelligence on topics such as those listed here.

(VUGRAPH #28)

(Non-crisis national intelligence products on geographic regions, strategic weapons, general purpose forces, economics, S&T, terrorism, and drug trafficking)

In response, a wide range of daily, weekly, monthly, and ad hoc products are now produced, most of them on an uncoordinated basis. They usually represent the views of a single agency and receive wide distribution among national consumers. We do not question the utility of these as agency or departmental products on these subjects. We simply use them as illustrations of the absence of national intelligence products integrating the best efforts of the entire community.

(VUGRAPH #29)

(National Intelligence Daily)

(Provide daily national intelligence on world-wide range of topics, written for national consumer; emphasis on community effort and dissenting views; produced by production elements, published with CIA facilities)

We propose that a National Intelligence Daily be developed as a true community product. The CIB is sometimes called a national product because State/INR and DIA are consulted on its articles. There

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is usually no more than casual assent to the CIA originated articles and seldom is there dissent. We recommend that the National Intelligence Daily be developed in such a way so as to permit all production elements to originate articles and participate actively in the coordination process. This process may involve incorporating a dissenting view in the product.

(VUGRAPH #30)

We also propose that a National Intelligence Weekly be published to summarize significant world-wide developments for the national consumer. The Weekly would emphasize non-crisis oriented intelligence. However, summaries of crisis situations in abbreviated form would not be excluded.

The Weekly would contain items originated by all intelligence agencies within a single national publication. It would allow agencies with views differing from those of the DCI on any issue to have their views provided to national consumers in a national publication. And it would provide an opportunity for the community to summarize the available information on a particular subject.

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We see the Weekly being produced by the existing production organizations with the National Intelligence Officers assisting in identification of topics and the coordination of articles and CIA's facilities being used for publication.

National Intelligence Estimates of the type now produced would continue as a part of the national product family.

With the exception of the National Intelligence Daily, the National Intelligence Weekly and the NIEs, we do not recommend the scheduled production of any national intelligence products.

(VUGRAPH #31)

Before reaching this decision we considered producing various daily, weekly and monthly publications on a scheduled basis. However, in the last analysis we rejected the concept of increasing the number of scheduled national intelligence products, because scheduled production tends to have a life of its own and products tend to outlive their usefulness.

(VUGRAPH #32)

In place of scheduled production, we propose that the DCI expand his use of the National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum.


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for purposes of ad hoc production. These could be initiated by the NIOs, who are in the best position to know the needs of the consumer, or by USIB principals who could recommend an item to the DCI for production as a NIAM.

The NIAM would utilize the resources of the entire community in support of the consumer, unlike the separate DIA, INR, ONE and OCI estimates and memorandums.

NIAMs may resolve some other problems. One of these is assuring that the right consumer gets the right product. Today, consumers are sometimes denied intelligence due to the fact that the information they need is contained within a highly classified multi-subject product. On the other hand, the single-subject NIAMs can be sent to only those people who need the intelligence, avoiding unnecessary disclosure.

(VUGRAPH #33)



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Here are a few examples of the types of subjects which the NIAMs might address. They are neither in competition with nor substitutes for NIEs or SNIEs.

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We visualize that NIEs will be produced under the guidance of the appropriate NIO and with support from all production elements.

(VUGRAPH #34)

Finally, there is the question of the NSSM response. We believe the NIO should coordinate the intelligence inputs to NSSM responses and that he will see to it that the response is prepared in the form of one of the products we have already outlined--the NIE, SNIE, NIAM, or Analysts Summary.

(VUGRAPH #35)

Let us illustrate how these national intelligence products could have been used in the Chilean crisis in September.

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
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national intelligence products

In summary then, these are the

(VUGRAPHI #37)

(Proposed Products: National Watch Officers Bulletin (NWOB), National Analysts Summary (NAS), Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), National Intelligence Daily (NID), National Intelligence Weekly (NIW), National Intelligence Analytical Memorandum (NIAM), National Intelligence Estimate (NIE))

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that we recommend be established or modified to meet the needs of the national consumer. The blue indicates non-crisis products and red indicates crisis-driven products. We are aware that these recommendations for new products and new production procedures may not engender universal joy. However, the criticisms of the products currently produced on an uncoordinated basis by the community are believed to be valid and improvement in the community's responsiveness is required. But more important, this list of "new" national intelligence products isn't that new. Of all these products, only the National Intelligence Daily and Weekly would be new scheduled products. The NIE, SNIE and NIAM already exist. The Bulletins and Summary would be the only new nonscheduled products.

Throughout this briefing we have concentrated upon the question-- "What national-level intelligence products are needed to meet the needs of the national consumer?". -- There is a related question, and that is, "What products currently being produced will no longer be needed if this family of national intelligence products is accepted?". Given the existence of the proposed family of national products the producers should review these publications

(VUGRAPH #38)

CIA CIB
DIA Intelligence Summary
NSA SIGINT Summary
OSR Memoranda
OCI Memoranda

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OER	Memoranda
ONE	Memoranda
DIA	Intelligence Bulletin
CIA	Developments in Indochina
CIA	Soviet Developments
DIA	Analyst Exchange
CIA	Scientific Intelligence Digest
INR	Soviet Foreign Policy Highlights

to determine if they have consumers for these departmental products. We do not recommend that these products be eliminated at this time. -- There are many consumers of intelligence other than the national consumers who need to be served. As an example, we noted that 3/4 ths of the readership of DIA's Intelligence Summary, as indicated by the distribution list, does not fall within the category of national consumers. It is for the individual producer to determine the necessity of expending resources to meet their departmental needs for intelligence.

In general, we hope that superior products will drive out less superior ones. We believe that the new family of national intelligence products will make some of these single agency products unnecessary. However, we recommend that the new products demonstrate their superiority first and that review then be made of the necessity for all these single agency intelligence products.

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Since the actual role of the NIOs has not been officially delineated, we made some assumptions as to how the NIO would fit into the production picture for national intelligence products. Even if the NIO has a role considerably different from that we envisaged, we consider this family of national products to be a valid package and responsive to the needs of our national consumers.

A copy of this briefing will be provided to you for later review and use by your staffs.

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